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Abstract:  Invertebrate animals are frequently lumped into a single category and denied welfare 
protections despite their considerable cognitive, behavioral, and evolutionary diversity. Some 
ethical and policy inroads have been made for cephalopod molluscs and crustaceans, but the vast 
majority of arthropods, including the insects, remain excluded from moral consideration. We argue 
that this exclusion is unwarranted given the existing evidence. Anachronistic readings of evolution, 
which view invertebrates as lower in the scala naturae, continue to influence public policy and 
common morality. The assumption that small brains are unlikely to support cognition or sentience 
likewise persists, despite growing evidence that arthropods have converged on cognitive functions 
comparable to those found in vertebrates. The exclusion of invertebrates is also motivated by 
cognitive-affective biases that covertly influence moral judgment, as well as a flawed balancing of 
scientific uncertainty against moral risk. All these factors shape moral attitudes toward basal 
vertebrates too, but they are particularly acute in the arthropod context. Moral consistency dictates 
that the same standards of evidence and risk management that justify policy protections for 
vertebrates also support extending moral consideration to certain invertebrates. Moving beyond a 
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1.  Introduction 
Even though they are remarkably diverse behaviorally, cognitively, and evolutionarily, 
invertebrate animals are often lumped into a single category and excluded from welfare-
based consideration. Where invertebrates are given ethical consideration in the regulation of 
research and in common morality, it is largely limited to considerations of conservation, 
where their value is assessed instrumentally in terms of the ecological services they provide 
within broader communities and ecosystems (Eisenhauer et al. 2019; Sánchez-Bayo & 
Wyckhuys 2019). Although the ecological approach to moral value makes sense for insentient 
animals (such as corals), it is inadequate for invertebrates with brains that could support rich 
forms of cognition and sentience, and thus a psychological welfare of their own. Major 
scientific funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), request 
information about proposed use only concerning vertebrate animals, explicitly encouraging 
scientists to replace vertebrates with invertebrates to promote ethically sounder research 
(Wilson-Sanders 2011, p. 127). Recently, some regulatory bodies in the European Union and 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees in the United States have created an exception 
for cephalopod molluscs (coleoids [octopuses/squid/cuttlefish] + nautiloids), which have 
attained the status of ‘honorary vertebrates’ as their cognitive capacities have drawn 
widespread recognition (Directive 2010/63/EU 2010; Low et al. 2012). U.S. federal agencies, 
however, such as the USDA, continue to classify cephalopods along with all other 
invertebrates as mere ‘dissected tissue’ (Carere & Mather 2019).  
Although these protections for coleoid cephalopod molluscs are encouraging, other 
invertebrate lineages with centralized nervous systems and flexible behaviors, such as 
arthropods (insects/crustaceans + arachnids + myriapods), continue to receive little to no 
welfare consideration even though they have been the subject of a systematic and wide-
ranging empirical investigation indicating that they have mental capacities that could give 
rise to morally protectable interests. Prompted by Elwood’s (2011; see also Harvey-Clark 
2011) research and lobbying, the EU did recently consider (though it ultimately rejected) 
granting protections to decapod crustaceans. We are aware of no such proposals for other 
arthropod groups, such as insects and spiders, which comprise the vast majority of 
arthropods found in nature and used in laboratories. 
 Much of the prevailing ethical thought on invertebrates took hold during a time when 
little was known about the cognitive capacities, neurological complexities, and flexible 
behaviors of certain invertebrate species. Over the last several decades, however, a growing 
body of research is pointing to sophisticated cognitive abilities in a number of invertebrate 
lineages. There is growing evidence that some molluscs and arthropods have the capacity for 
subjective experience (i.e., sentience: Klein & Barron 2016; Mather 2019a; Godfrey-Smith 
2017). Nevertheless, with rare exceptions, such as the recent attention afforded to octopuses 
(Godfrey-Smith 2016), philosophers and policymakers have continued to operate on the 
basis of outdated information about invertebrate cognition and behavior. Philosophers who 
have engaged with invertebrate cognition and consciousness (e.g., Schwitzgebel 2018; Klein 
& Barron 2016; Feinberg & Mallatt 2016/2018; Tye 2016) have typically demurred on the 
ethical implications of these findings. (One exception is Carruthers (2007), whose view is 
discussed in §3.3, has taken a stance but a negative one.) Philosophical discussions of animal 
welfare, meanwhile, have focused on mammals and birds, extending only recently to basal 
vertebrates like fishes (see the commentary on Woodruff 2017). Although pioneering work 
on invertebrate welfare is found in scientific forums (see ILAR 2011; Carere & Mather 2019), 




it has interacted little with philosophical ethics and has been met with resistance in public 
policy — although there are signs this landscape is beginning to change (Rethink Priorities 
2019). 
 In this target article, we argue that the exclusion of certain invertebrates from 
bioethics and science policy is not warranted given the state of the evidence and plausible 
conceptions of moral standing. We attribute the exclusion of arthropods in general, and 
terrestrial arthropods in particular, to the following four factors:  
 
(i) a lingering progressivist reading of evolution according to which invertebrates are lower in the 
scala naturae;  
(ii) the a priori assumption that small brains are unlikely to support sophisticated cognition or 
sentience (which is contrary to the existing body of behavioral and neuroscientific evidence, 
principles of evolutionary continuity, and the potential for convergence on psychological 
functions);  
(iii) human cognitive-affective biases that distort moral judgments and mental state attributions 
concerning unfamiliar, disgust-provoking beings;  
(iv) an inappropriate balancing of scientific uncertainty and moral risk.  
 
Although some or all of these problems are likely to shape moral attitudes and policy toward 
basal vertebrate lineages (such as fish and lizards), they are particularly acute in the 
arthropod context.  Similarly, while uncertainties about the presence of sophisticated forms 
of cognition and sentience pervade all of comparative cognitive science, they are most 
pronounced in research on the minds of invertebrates, whose brains, behaviors, and life 
histories share few ancestral similarities with those of vertebrates. Appreciating the diverse 
forms of sentience found throughout the animal kingdom may not only lead to a more 
inclusive animal ethics, but it may also shed light on foundational moral concepts themselves. 
Making progress on these issues, however, requires that we engage with the formidable 
conceptual and methodological challenges that confront the scientific and moral study of 
‘alien’ minds on Earth.  
  
2.  Challenging the Invertebrate Dogma 
To understand the differential ethical treatment that has been accorded to vertebrates and 
invertebrates, it is useful to begin with the problematic nature of the distinction itself. The 
category ‘invertebrate’ does not represent a proper clade, since the groups included under 
this umbrella do not share a single common ancestor that is not also shared with vertebrates. 
Moreover, the vertebrate-invertebrate distinction lumps the immense diversity of 
invertebrate life into a single undifferentiated category, doing more to obscure morally 
relevant cognitive diversity among animals than to illuminate it. Worse still, the vertebrate-
invertebrate dichotomy is a value-laden one, with invertebrates taken, either explicitly or 
implicitly, to occupy a lower rung in the scala naturae. Pre-Darwinian evolutionary 
iconography, such as Ernst Haeckel’s Pedigree of Man, depicts the history of life as an ‘ascent’ 
from monad to man with invertebrates occupying the second-lowest tier, just above protozoa 
but below non-mammalian vertebrates.  
 Whereas biology has long since jettisoned progressivist readings of evolutionary 
history, bioethics and policy remain very much encumbered by them. For instance, The NIH 
asks researchers who are proposing to use vertebrates in an experiment to explain why ‘less 
highly evolved’ animal models, such as invertebrates, could not be used instead. We are not 




suggesting that this anachronistic evolutionary baggage fully explains the moral exclusion of 
invertebrates. Nor does it show that this treatment of invertebrates is indefensible in 
principle. However, in raising suspicions about the validity of attitudes and institutionalized 
practices toward invertebrates, it provides a launching point for a fuller explanation and 
evaluation. 
 The most plausible justification for the moral exclusion of invertebrates is that they 
lack the psychological properties that give rise to ‘moral standing,’ or the intrinsic value that 
places constraints on how a being may be treated. There is no consensus about the minimum 
psychological conditions necessary for a life that matters for its own sake (Buchanan 2009). 
Nor is there agreement about the psychological conditions above this minimum that give rise 
to higher moral statuses or, if one prefers, to weightier moral interests. There is, however, 
broad philosophical consensus that to have a welfare is to have a life that can go well or poorly 
for the subject of experience. What makes a life go well or poorly can be glossed in different 
ways, such as in terms of pleasure and pain, the fulfillment of desires, the pursuit of valuable 
personal projects, an ‘objective’ list of circumstances that would make one’s life go well 
irrespective of one’s actual desires, and so forth (Crisp 2017). At the center of all of these 
views, however, is an experiencing subject of a life that matters in its own right. If 
invertebrates do not have welfares, then they have no interests, preferences, or desires to 
take into account and hence they may be exploited as mere instruments to the ends of others. 
For these reasons, we operate on the assumption that welfare is a psychological property and 
that some form of mental life is a precondition for morally protectable interests. Some more 
expansive theories of moral standing would include entities whose insentience is 
uncontroversial, such as bacteria, forests, and rivers, but we will not address those views here 
(see Basl 2019 for a critical discussion). 
 We will refer to the notion that invertebrates are not loci of welfare — and hence that 
they may be excluded from ethical consideration in research, husbandry, agriculture, and 
human activities more broadly — as the ‘invertebrate dogma.’ In what follows, we will argue 
that the current state of comparative research on brains, behavior, consciousness, and 
emotion suggests that even small-brained invertebrates are likely to have welfares and hence 
moral standing. Many of the same experimental paradigms that have been used to establish 
the existence of sophisticated cognition and sentience in vertebrates have also been used —
and their findings replicated — in research on invertebrate cognition. The case we will make, 
therefore, is one of consistency: the same empirical and philosophical basis for extending 
protections to all vertebrates calls for extending similar protections to some invertebrate 
clades.  
 
2.1 Brains.  One reason invertebrates with complex brains and behavior may be thought to 
lack the cognitive and affective properties that comprise a welfare is the high prior 
probability some assign to the notion that very small brains cannot (or are highly unlikely to) 
generate mental states. The idea is that there are minimum neuro-computational thresholds 
for mind that are not met by invertebrates. This is not a concern in the case of some coleoid 
molluscs, such as octopuses, whose neural densities and structural complexities rival those 
of mammals (even taking into account the distributed nature of coleoid nervous systems). 
However, the same cannot be said for other, small-brained invertebrates, such as arthropods, 
who comprise a large fraction of invertebrates used in research. The assumption that small 
brains are unlikely to support sentient life is problematic, however, for several reasons.  




 First, the neuro-computational thresholds needed to generate minimum mental 
capacities are unknown and cannot be determined from the armchair. Neural network 
analysis is helpful insofar as it allows us to experiment with minimal wiring solutions for 
specific cognitive functions, but these are highly idealized; independent evidence is needed 
to establish that the options selected by the model would have been available to natural 
selection. It is critical, therefore, that we investigate what small centralized nervous systems 
can actually do in the world. Just as important, we need to work out how they do these things 
(see Budaev et al. 2019 for further discussion). Behavioral data from carefully controlled 
experiments are indispensable for both these projects. Until we have a fully worked out and 
empirically corroborated theory of the relationships among neural tissue, cognitive 
processes, and phenomenology, we are not in a position to rule out or even deem unlikely the 
possibility that tiny brains can give rise to sentient lives with interests that merit moral 
protection.  
Second, relative brain size is a better indicator of cognitive sophistication than 
absolute brain size, since (ceteris paribus) it indicates that there has been differential 
evolutionary investment in metabolically costly brain tissue that pays for itself through the 
cognitive functions that additional neuro-processing power provides. However, even relative 
brain-size analysis is too coarse-grained (Healy & Rowe 2006), especially across distantly 
related taxa (Logan et al. 2018), to allow for any definitive judgments about cognitive 
potential. More fine-grained features, such as total neuron number, neuron density, 
connectivity, metabolic rate, and modularity are better indicators of the cognitive capacities 
of brains (Chittka & Niven 2009; Chitkka & Farris 2012). Most of these features, however, do 
not scale linearly with size. A higher neuron number, for instance, might be achieved by 
increasing not brain volume but neuron density, and by shrinking the size of neurons 
(Olkowicz et al. 2016).1 Although arthropods have smaller neuron totals than coleoids and 
vertebrates, neural network models suggest that some forms of cognition may be 
computationally inexpensive and can be accomplished with small numbers of neurons 
(Logan et al. 2018). As with computers, bigger is not necessarily better. There is no reason to 
think that there are high minimum size thresholds for the presence of the kinds of mental 
states that factor into sentience.  
 More important than total computing power is how information is integrated in the 
brain and embodied in the organism, as inferred from the structure of brains and behavior. 
The brains of many insects, spiders, and coleoid molluscs have structural characteristics that 
could support sophisticated forms of cognition. In particular, they have central processing 
regions (the ‘mushroom bodies’ and central complex in arthropods and the vertical lobes in 
coleoids) that continuously receive, integrate, and exchange information with peripheral 
systems via ‘reentrant pathways’ (Giurfa 2013; Edelman & Gally 2013), permitting 
centralized coordination of multi-modal sensory information and executive (top-down) 
 
1 Smaller brain size may actually confer advantages. For example, smaller brains tend to have shorter inter-
neuronal distances; these shrink the distance that information has to travel and thus conduction delays. 
Arthropods also have multi-functional neurons that economize on available space and energy while 
preserving a range of functionalities. At the same time, miniaturization may force tradeoffs, such as between 
modularity (needed for functional specialization) and redundancy (needed for parallel processing). 
Miniaturization also imposes costs: for example, it restricts total neuron number and limits available energy 
by reducing space for mitochondria. (For comprehensive reviews, see Chittka & Niven 2009 and Niven & 
Farris 2012.) 




control. The cognitive signatures of centralized information processing are reflected in the 
behavioral complexity of these animals, as we shall now see. 
 
2.2 Behavior and cognition.  Although some researchers were initially skeptical that flexible 
behaviors could be generated by tiny arthropod brains, the combined weight of the 
neuroscientific and behavioral evidence suggests that complex cognition may be much more 
broadly distributed in the tree of animal life than previously thought. It is now well known 
that coleoid molluscs (octopus, squid, and cuttlefish), who have large, hierarchically 
structured brains, have excellent spatial navigation and communication abilities, excel at 
problem-solving, and may even use rudimentary tools (Mather 2019a; Finn et al. 2009). Less 
widely appreciated is the substantial accumulation of experimental evidence, thanks in large 
part to the pioneering work of Lars Chittka and his collaborators, that some arthropods are 
capable of sophisticated cognitive feats that indicate the presence of a richer mental life than 
traditionally thought, one that may give rise to a welfare. 
 For example, among the insects, there is evidence that honeybees can learn abstract 
concepts (Chittka 2017; Howard et al. 2017) including same/different, larger/smaller, and 
above/below. They can also transfer these concepts across sensory modalities (e.g., from 
vision to olfaction). Honeybees can be taught addition and subtraction procedures (Howard 
et al. 2018/2019), appear to have the concept of ‘zero’ (Nieder 2018), and can learn to attend 
to global or local features of objects (Dyer et al. 2016). Bumblebees can not only learn 
complex and highly non-instinctive tasks, such as rolling a tiny ball (Loukola et al. 2017) or 
pulling a string to reel in a reward: they can transmit this information culturally (Alem et al. 
2016). They can also recognize objects and patterns through one modality (e.g., touch, 
olfaction) that they previously encountered only in another modality (e.g., vision) (Solvi et al. 
2020; Lawson et al. 2018). Bees and wasps can recognize human faces, although only wasps 
do so without prior training (Dyer et al. 2005; Chittka 2017). One study suggests that ants 
can pass the mirror self-recognition test (Cammaerts 2015), which human infants only pass 
at around 20 months of age. There is even tantalizing evidence of causal reasoning and 
means-end rationality in bees (Loukola et al. 2017) and transitive inference in paper wasps 
(Tibbetts et al. 2019). 
 Bees are excellent models for the study of invertebrate cognition because they are 
highly trainable, responsive to rewards, and neurologically complex. For these reasons, while 
bees may be model insects, they are not necessarily the best model for other insects. The 
extent to which findings in bees (or hymenopterans more broadly) generalize to other 
arthropods is unclear. However, flexible learning mechanisms and the neural correlates of 
attention have also been shown in flies, cockroaches, and other insect orders (for a review, 
see Greenspan & Swinderen 2004). Among arachnids, jumping spiders (salticids) have been 
shown to plan routes that include elaborate detours, deploy sophisticated ambush strategies, 
and switch flexibly among hunting techniques in order to overcome the defenses of 
unfamiliar prey types (Harland & Jackson 2000). Salticids have also demonstrated 
numerosity abilities at the level of human infants (Cross & Jackson 2017); many insects seem 
to have such capacities (Skorupski et al. 2018; Giurfa 2019). These findings are consistent 
with ‘thinking’ broadly construed and, taken in conjunction with comparative brain data, call 
the invertebrate dogma into question.  
 Many of the arthropod cognition studies are modelled on studies of vertebrate 
cognition, which were adapted from paradigms in human developmental psychology. 




Although performance is not always comparable across invertebrate and vertebrate animals 
(see Abramson & Wells 2018 for examples and discussion), experiments that do show 
parallel results are instructive: Bees have been taught to distinguish between human painting 
styles (such as impressionism and cubism) using techniques and controls that were used to 
demonstrate the same ability in pigeons (Wu et al. 2013). Bees and wasps can learn to 
recognize faces and patterns holistically (Avarguès-Weber et al. 2010), with performance 
that approximates that of vertebrates trained to make the same sorts of discriminations 
(Marzluff et al. 2010). Bees were found to respond to ambiguous stimuli with decreased 
confidence and to opt out of difficult choices (Perry & Barron 2013) using the same 
uncertainty-monitoring paradigm that has been used to probe for this aspect of 
metacognition in a wide variety of vertebrates, from rats to dolphins (Foote & Crystal 2007; 
Smith & Washburn 2005). Tests of numerosity in jumping spiders use the same ‘looking time’ 
paradigm — measuring surprise and expectation — that is used to probe for belief-states in 
vertebrates including pre-linguistic humans. Honeybees were found to discriminate 
quantities containing up to six items on a delayed match-to-sample task (Gross et al. 2009), 
the same task that has been used productively with vertebrates such as dolphins and rhesus 
macaques (Killian et al. 2003; Brannon et al. 2000). Studies of affect in bees and flies use the 
same ‘cognitive bias’ paradigm as in studies of emotion in vertebrates (Mendl et al. 2009; 
more on this in §2.3).  
The same behavior can have multiple cognitive realizations, so these findings might 
reflect evolutionary convergence on behavioral flexibility without convergence on the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms that produce that flexibility. Deflationary (simpler) 
cognitive explanations of impressive arthropod performance cannot be decisively ruled out. 
(On association-based explanations of abstract concept learning in insects, see Vasas & 
Chittka 2019; Cope et al. 2018.) However, and this is key, neither can deflationary cognitive 
explanations of vertebrate performance be ruled out, even in the case of very young human 
children. Moreover, complex cognitive explanations of invertebrate behavior may turn out to 
be less burdensome computationally and more parsimonious — and in these respects 
‘simpler’ (see §4.1) — evolutionarily than their deflationary counterparts (Perry & Chittka 
2019). Thus, in the absence of other assumptions that have yet to be articulated, the 
behavioral evidence does not justify the asymmetrical ethical treatment of vertebrates and 
invertebrates. 
That said, it is not clear that the cognitive capacities probed in the above experiments 
are necessary conditions for moral standing, since creatures may be sentient even if they lack, 
say, numerosity, transitive inference, or problem-solving. Nor are these cognitive abilities 
clearly sufficient for moral standing: a system may be capable of sophisticated cognitive feats 
but lack the feeling that would ordinarily accompany them, as may be true of some AI and 
insentient robots. Nevertheless, these findings do point to the ability to classify the world into 
meaningful categories, to forge new associations among them, and to make these available 
for adaptive action. Such flexible learning abilities are probably underwritten, at least in 
naturally evolved organisms, by valenced states of pleasure and pain that motivate learned 
discriminations and configure sentient experience. 
 
2.3 Sentience.  The traditional idea that arthropods are incapable of flexible learning and do 
not form sophisticated representations of their world has been refuted by the body of 
research on invertebrate cognition summarized above. Nevertheless, one could try to salvage 




the invertebrate dogma by arguing that even if small-brained invertebrates like arthropods 
are surprisingly sophisticated cognitively, they lack the felt experience and emotional 
capacities that make them matter morally.  
 
2.3.1. Subjective experience.  If a creature is incapable of experience — if there is nothing it 
feels like from the inside to be that creature (Nagel 1974) — then it cannot be a locus of 
pleasurable and aversive states, it has no interests that can be set back, and hence it can be 
neither harmed nor benefitted. In other words, there is no meaningful notion of psychological 
welfare for that system. Phenomenal consciousness is thus a precondition for moral standing 
(Kahane & Savulescu 2009). 
 Phenomenal consciousness was traditionally linked to human-like cortical structures, 
and hence it was widely assumed that animals who lack these structures (e.g., fishes, birds, 
and all invertebrates) are unlikely to be subjects of experience (Key 2016; Rose 2002). 
However, there are several clear limitations of this homology-based approach. First and most 
obviously, it overlooks the possibility that there has been evolutionary convergence on the 
neurofunctional organizations that give rise to experiencing subjects (Dinets 2016; Elwood 
2016; Güntürkün 2012, Güntürkün & Bugnyar 2016; Low et al. 2012). Second, many cortical 
functions in humans were co-opted from more ancient brain structures that predated the 
evolution of the cortex. Third, the cortex-centric approach does not explain why vertebrates 
that lack the six-layered cortex found in mammals (such as birds, lizards, and fish) are 
commonly included in the research ethics calculus, whereas invertebrates are systematically 
excluded. 
 Furthermore, complex functional traits (sensory, locomotive, computational, 
metabolic, etc.) can not only be realized by disparate anatomical, developmental, and 
biomolecular bases — they are also generally continuous rather than discrete. Thus, one 
might expect phenomenal consciousness to be continuously distributed in the animal world 
with no clear cut-off between experiencers and those that are incapable of experience. The 
key unanswered question, of course, is what the lowest bounds of this spectrum might look 
like. On the other hand, some theorists (e.g., Carruthers 2019) contend that phenomenal 
consciousness is a discrete rather than continuous property: the lights are either on or off; 
there is no ‘dimmer switch.’ But even if the capacity for experience does not admit of degrees, 
this, too, leaves the minimal experience problem unresolved: how we identify the simplest or 
most primitive character states that give rise to conscious experience. 
It has also been shown, however, that many cognitive and perceptual functions are 
carried out unconsciously in humans (for a review, see Boly et al. 2013). This decoupling has 
led some ethologists (Cartmill 2017) and philosophers (Allen-Hermanson 2008) to suggest 
that arthropods may be the closest that evolution has come to producing real-life examples 
of ‘philosophical zombies’ (Chalmers 1996) — logically conceivable creatures whose 
behavior is indistinguishable from that of conscious beings but for whom all is ‘dark on the 
inside.’ This case is strengthened by robots that replicate the behavior of nonhuman animals 
without, presumably, reproducing the experiential qualities that are normally thought to 
attend those behaviors. However, there is a large gap between the idea that some cognitive 
operations and behaviors are carried out unconsciously in humans or human artifacts and 
the notion that active, intentional, behaviorally flexible, and yet wholly non-conscious 
cognitive creatures actually exist in the world.   




 Alternatively, one might accept that some invertebrates are phenomenally conscious 
but deny they are moral patients on the grounds that they do not exceed the ‘richness’ 
threshold for the content of subjective experience that is necessary for moral standing (see, 
e.g., Frey 1983). No one has yet demonstrated precisely what such a threshold would look 
like, however, nor on what philosophical grounds it would be justified. Moreover, if 
arthropod behavioral experiments probe the cognitive content of conscious experience, then 
there is evidence for cognitively ‘rich’ experience in arthropods of the sort often used to 
justify extending protections to vertebrate animals in research and agricultural contexts.2  
 
2.3.2. Feeling.  Phenomenal consciousness alone is not an adequate basis by which to 
establish the existence of a welfare. It is empirically inadequate because the concept of 
phenomenal consciousness is hotly contested and, on some definitions, impossible to 
measure. It is conceptually inadequate because, in addition to having experiences, a being 
must also care about what happens to it in some basic sense. And if things are to matter to an 
organism, it must be capable of experiencing states of affairs as pleasurable or aversive, even 
if it does not explicitly recognize them as such. We think this affective glossing of conscious 
experience is better captured by the term sentience.3  
Unlike phenomenal consciousness, whose causal powers and evolutionary functions 
are unclear, affectively valenced states play a clearer role in adaptive behavior. The 
motivational force of emotions comes from the embodied feelings that attend a given 
appraisal (James 1890). Without the ability to attach feelings to actions and objects, animals 
(at least as they are constituted on Earth) would be incapable of complex action, decision-
making, and learning (Damasio 1994). Some arthropods appear capable not only of 
perceiving objects as ‘bound’ wholes rather than non-integrated collections of local features, 
but capable also of classifying objects into appropriately valenced categories like ‘predator,’ 
‘prey,’ ‘mate,’ ‘foraging item,’ ‘obstacle,’ etc., which in turn support sophisticated feats of 
learning, navigation, foraging, and cooperation.   
The scientific study of affect among invertebrates is still fairly new, but evidence 
suggests that insects have convergently evolved ‘emotion-like’ states or embodied action 
tendencies that in some cases are mediated by the same neurotransmitters that modulate 
emotion in humans (Perry et al. 2016; Burke et al. 2012: see Baracchi et al. 2017 for careful 
review). For example, bumblebees tend to interpret ambiguous stimuli more optimistically 
after exposure to a pleasant stimulus, just as humans tend to do when they are happy or calm. 
Conversely, vigorously shaking bees appears to induce a pessimistic bias in odor 
discrimination tests. In these experiments, bees are first trained to associate one odor with a 
 
2 There is an ongoing philosophical debate over how to think about the relation between cognitive 
sophistication and moral considerability. Some understand moral considerability in terms of differences in 
moral statuses that are achieved when a certain threshold of mental capacity is met (such as sentience or 
rationality); others would describe moral considerability in terms of a single threshold for sentience beyond 
which there is a continuum of interests that are factors in different moral obligations (for discussions, see 
DeGrazia 2008; McMahan 2009). Our argument is compatible with both of these approaches. 
3 Whether the presence of affect is an indicator of phenomenal consciousness depends on the theories of affect 
and consciousness that one chooses to adopt; it also depends on whether one conceives of valence in 
representational terms or rather as an intrinsic quality of evaluative experience (Carruthers 2018). If valence 
is an intrinsic quality of experience, then all phenomenally-conscious states are sentient states and all 
phenomenally-conscious creatures are sentient creatures.  




sucrose reward and another with quinine punishment, and then they are presented with 
samples containing different ratios of each odor (Bateson et al. 2011). While Bateson et al. 
interpreted their results as indicating that bees have emotion-like states, Giurfa (2013) 
advanced an alternative deflationary explanation, which was subsequently cited favorably in 
a major review of pain in animals (Sneddon et al. 2014). According to Giurfa’s interpretation, 
the shaking may have triggered improved discrimination rather than inducing displeasure. 
However, if shaking had improved judgment, then shaken bees’ performance should have 
improved for all discriminations, including ambiguous odors toward the sucrose-rich 
(pleasant) end of the spectrum. Instead, Bateson’s results show a steady decline in the shaken 
bees’ willingness to sample any of the options, exactly as the pessimism hypothesis predicts.  
 
2.3.3. Pain.  Of all affectively valenced feelings, pain is perhaps most at the center of moral 
questions surrounding the treatment of nonhuman animals. The evidence for vertebrate-like 
pain in invertebrates is mixed and inconclusive. Many invertebrates have nociceptors, or 
specialized neural receptors that detect tissue damage. These specialized cells predate the 
split of bilaterally symmetric animals into deuterostomes (vertebrates and echinoderms) and 
protostomes (all other bilaterian invertebrates), and are hence present in bilaterians without 
centralized nervous systems (Smith & Lewin 2009). If we presume that pain perception 
requires a brain, then nociception is not sufficient for pain perception (Allen et al. 2005). 
While there is agreement that pain perception occurs downstream of nociceptor input 
(Tracey 2017), the nature of that downstream processing remains poorly understood.  
Markers of traditional pain perception include the presence of endogenous opioids, 
responsiveness to anaesthetics and analgesics, grooming of injured body parts, a reduction 
in grooming behavior under analgesia, and ‘motivational tradeoffs’ such as when hermit 
crabs are willing to withstand a mild electric shock in order to obtain a more desirable shell 
(Elwood 2011/2012). Shrimps groom their antennae after sustaining an injury — a behavior 
reduced when given an analgesic (Barr et al. 2008). Coleoid molluscs show long-term 
nociceptive sensitization following moderate injury (Crooke et al. 2011), and a recent study 
showed that anaesthetic agents commonly used in research with octopuses and cuttlefish do 
not merely immobilize them, but actively suppress both afferent and efferent signals to and 
from the CNS, suggesting that these agents suppress not only nociception but also pain 
perception (Butler-Struben et al. 2018). On the other hand, some insects engage in normal 
feeding and mating behaviors even after sustaining severe injuries, such as dismemberment 
(Eisemann et al. 1984; Smith 1991). If confirmed, these findings would suggest either that 
these animals do not experience pain (Broom 2013), that they do not experience pain in the 
way that vertebrates do,4 or that the circumstances generating pain in these lineages differ 
from those in vertebrates.  
 
4 There is also no reason to think that pain is more likely to have attendant subjective states than other 
cognitive and affective states. If we assume that unconscious affective states are possible, as some 
representationalist theories of mind allow (Carruthers 2019), pain ‘zombies’ may be just as conceivable as 
cognitively complex zombies. Although some would contend that pain is necessarily painful, research on a 
condition known as pain asymbolia calls this into question. Subjects with this condition report experiencing 
pain as pain but not as unpleasant or aversive, which suggests that the perception of pain and the experience 
of its aversiveness can come apart. There is some controversy over whether individuals with pain asymbolia 
actually experience pain as affectively neutral or whether they are simply indifferent to and unmotivated by 
 




Even if cognitively sophisticated invertebrates do not experience pain in the same way 
that mammals and other vertebrates do, this would not imply they have no morally 
protectable interests. A being may have a rich phenomenal and affective inner life, and hence 
a welfare of its own, even if it lacks vertebrate-like experiences in response to tissue damage. 
It is important to distinguish pain perception narrowly understood from a broader notion of 
suffering that includes stress, frustration, and other aversive states that flow from the 
inability to fulfill one’s desires. The presence or absence of vertebrate-like pain response is 
relevant to the question of what sorts of treatments are ethically permissible, but it should 
not be the focal point in our conception of moral standing. Nor are our moral obligations 
limited to providing environments that are free of pain broadly construed; they also require 
that we provide positive conditions in which sentient animals can flourish — environments 
in which they can experience greater amounts of pleasure and develop their natural range of 
abilities (Nussbaum 2009). 
There are sound theoretical reasons to think that arthropods and some other 
invertebrates are capable of experiencing pleasurable and aversive states. The leading 
evolutionary explanation of pain is that pain facilitates instrumental learning, helping 
animals to avoid future exposure to dangerous or noxious agents. If pain is an adaptive 
mechanism through which animals learn which situations to avoid — and pleasure the same 
in reverse — then an animal that is capable of instrumental learning may also be capable of 
experiencing aversive and pleasurable states (Godfrey-Smith 2017). The presence of open-
ended associative learning in a lineage — including the ability to attach valences to non-
stereotypical action sequences — is thus potentially a useful indicator of sentience (Ginsburg 
& Jablonka 2019). As we have seen, there is evidence that some invertebrates, such as some 
molluscs and insects, are capable of instrumental learning. This is supported by the large 
body of research on invertebrate cognition discussed above, as well as experimental evidence 
of learning via negative reinforcement (Tedjakumala & Giurfa 2013; for a survey of 
associative learning in invertebrates, see Hawkins & Byrne 2015). 
At the same time, however, there are reasons to be skeptical about arthropod pain. In 
their highly cited review of the animal pain literature, Sneddon et al. (2014) argue that the 
success of robotic models in simulating some aspects of pain behavior undercuts the case for 
pain in arthropods (see also Adamo 2016). Their reasoning is that pain behavior can be 
reproduced by systems that are clearly incapable of experiencing pain, and thus ‘insects, and 
possibly other animals, could use simple processing rules to produce pain-like behaviour, 
without any internal experience of pain’ (Sneddon et al. 2014). They go even further to 
suggest that there is currently no definitive evidence that insects have the cognitive and 
emotional capacities that could support aversive mental states.  
But why single out insects in this regard? Indeed, one of the robotic models they cite 
is a robotic ‘rodent’ designed to reproduce vertebrate-like pain behavior. If robotic models 
drive a wedge between behavioural evidence and ascriptions of pain perception, they ought 
to do so for all animals — vertebrates included. Moreover, the requirement that evidence of 
pain perception be ‘definitive’ is at odds with prevailing evidentiary standards for any 
proposition in the field of comparative cognition, let alone for policies that are intended to 
 
the experience of pain (Klein 2015). In any case, as with unconscious cognition, the fact that pain states in a 
subset of humans with a dysfunctional condition are not experienced as painful does not establish that some 
sentient creatures are in fact pain-zombies. 




manage moral risk (see §4). Zombie hypotheses cannot be definitively ruled out; but this is 
as true for vertebrates, including other humans, as it is for invertebrates. 
 
3. Cognitive-Affective Biases 
Lingering progressivist readings of evolution (see Chapman & Huffman 2018) and dismissive 
views about the mental capacities of invertebrates are probably not the whole story behind 
the treatment of invertebrates. Historically, the pernicious moral exclusion of human groups 
has resulted from cognitive-affective biases that shape empirical beliefs and judgments about 
moral standing (Buchanan & Powell 2018; Powell et al. 2020). We are in no way equating the 
moral exclusion of invertebrates with the mistreatment of human beings; our point is simply 
that the treatment of invertebrates in policy, philosophy, and common morality may offer 
another illustration of moral exclusion driven by these distorting influences.  
 
3.1 The empathy gap.  Empathy is well known to modulate moral judgment: people tend to 
morally favor those they empathize with over those with whom they do not. And people tend 
to empathize with individuals who look more like them, who are judged to be more 
aesthetically attractive, who are potential reciprocating partners, and who are classified as 
members of one’s in-group. They tend to have less empathy for — and hence to pass more 
severe moral judgment upon or assign lower moral weight to — individuals who are less 
similar, less subjectively attractive, or belong to an out-group such as a disfavored race, 
ethnicity, or nationality (Prinz 2011; Hewstone 1990). Empathy also mediates attributions of 
mental states: empathy deficits are associated with dementalization (the wholesale denial of 
mind), decreased mentalization, and reduced sympathy for the victims of violence (for a 
review, see Kozak et al. 2006). At the same time, the ‘cuteness response’ (Sherman & Haidt 
2011) — an emotional state directed at beings deemed to be cute — is associated with 
enhanced empathy and mental-state attribution and it increases prosocial engagement in 
ways that lead to moral inclusion. 
 The ‘alien-ness’ of invertebrate morphologies and lifeways makes the empathy gap 
difficult to bridge. The vast majority of invertebrates with complex brains, such as coleoid 
molluscs and many arthropods, are rarely considered attractive, cute, or cuddly, and their 
body plans, some of their behaviors, communications, forms of sociality, and life histories are 
very unfamiliar to humans. As a result, they do not tend to elicit empathy or to be accorded 
mental states; this in turn makes it more likely that their interests will be discounted in moral 
decision-making. There is also evidence that a timescale bias influences mind attribution: 
animals and robots that move at human-typical speeds are more likely to be attributed 
mental states than those that move at speeds unfamiliar to humans (Morewedge 2007) such 
as those typical for arthropods (fast) and molluscs (slow).  
 
3.2 The disgust response.  Perhaps more important than the lack of empathy-eliciting 
features in invertebrates is the outright disgust many of these animals trigger in a large 
fraction of the human population. The disgust reaction and associated ‘gape face’ is thought 
to have originally evolved as a mechanism for avoiding pathogens (Kelly 2011); however, 
disgust appears to have been co-opted to mediate social interactions and regulate moral 
judgment (Fischer 2016; Kumar 2017; May 2018). In modern humans, disgust plays an 
important role in driving morally exclusionary norms, attitudes, and behaviors. Using disgust 
to trigger dehumanization is a well-known tactic of would-be genocides and ethnic cleansers. 




Nativist and racist propagandists draw explicitly on the disgust response toward nonhuman 
animals in portraying immigrants and other out-group races and ethnicities as disease-
bearing vermin; insects like cockroaches, rats, or lice; or free-riding social parasites ‘leeching’ 
off the hard work of the ‘pure’ races (for reviews, see Haslam 2006; Navarrete & Fessler 
2006). Whereas the cuteness response promotes increased social engagement with 
subjectively cute beings, disgust leads to avoidance and disengagement from disgust-eliciting 
beings (Sherman & Haidt 2011). Disgust can cause people to fail to attribute (or to under-
attribute) not only intentional cognitive states but also experiential qualities such as pain 
perception (Waytz et al. 2010), leading to ‘moral disengagement’ (Bandura 2002).  
If invertebrates — especially arthropods like insects and spiders — score very low on 
the empathy scale, they receive high marks on the scale of subjective disgust. Priming for 
disgust increases the moral derogation of human agents (Schnall et al. 2008; Eskine et al. 
2011), and we might expect it to operate similarly, if not more acutely, when directed at 
beings who are the immediate objects of the disgust response. Many arthropods map 
generically onto ecological categories that are associated either with parasite threat or 
physical dangers such as stings and bites, even though few of them actually pose a threat to 
humans. A number of arthropod parasites prey directly on humans, and larval forms of 
certain insects are associated with rotting flesh, dung, and other disgust-triggering stimuli. 
Although these account for a small fraction of arthropods, they tend to provoke an 
overgeneralized aggression-avoidance response that is characteristic of antisocial attitudes 
under conditions of perceived parasite threat (Fincher & Thornhill 2012; Navarrete & Fessler 
2006). Although negative attitudes toward invertebrates are to some degree culturally 
transmitted and ameliorated by exposure and education (Mather 2019b; Shipley et al. 2017), 
they are likely to emanate in part from an entrenched adaptive heuristic for managing risk in 
the Pleistocene and perhaps earlier in vertebrate-arthropod coevolution. It should not be 
surprising, therefore, that disgust-provoking animals like arthropods tend to be excluded 
from any institutionalized morality that relies on empathetic response. 
 
3.3 Moral justification.  In one of the rare substantive philosophical discussions of arthropod 
moral standing, philosopher of mind Peter Carruthers (2007) argues that although some 
arthropods are probably capable of having beliefs and desires that give rise to interests, we 
have no reason to care about their welfare and hence to afford them ethical protections: 
 
It is a fixed point for me that invertebrates make no direct claims on us, despite possessing minds 
in the sense that makes sympathy and moral concern possible. Invertebrates believe things, want 
things, and make simple plans, and they are capable of having their plans thwarted and their 
desires frustrated. But it isn’t wrong to take no account of their suffering. Indeed, I would regard 
the contrary belief as a serious moral perversion. (p. 296) 
 
Carruthers maintains, in effect, that invertebrates pose a ‘slippery slope’ problem for animal 
ethics: Either we must extend moral consideration to arthropods — which he takes to be 
patently absurd — or else we must reject welfarist accounts of animal moral standing in favor 
of some alternative account, such as a contractualist view which would limit moral standing 
to rational agents who can make and respond to moral claims.   
If Carruthers’s argument were sound, it would remove nearly all nonhuman animals, 
vertebrates included, from moral consideration. It would not, therefore, single out 




invertebrates for special exclusion, despite their being the central focus of his article. As we 
see it, the rhetorical role that invertebrate welfare plays in Carruthers’s argument is to show 
that the welfarist approach to moral standing leads to an absurd conclusion: namely, that we 
ought to care about the wellbeing of some invertebrates. However, this begs the very question 
at issue by simply asserting that extending moral consideration to some invertebrates is 
patently absurd — an intuition that Carruthers takes as ‘a fixed point,’ rather than one that is 
subject to critical revision in light of new empirical evidence or philosophical argument. Why 
should we reject a coherent, well-worked out, and highly corroborated theory of moral 
standing, rather than scrutinize a moral intuition that supposedly conflicts with it? Indeed, 
we should be suspicious of moral intuitions when there is reason to think they have been 
distorted by cognitive-affective biases (Clarke & Roache 2009), which, as we’ve seen, are 
especially pronounced in the arthropod context. 
Although Carruthers does not subscribe to a rank speciesism or ‘phyla-ism,’ his view 
is fundamentally at odds with prevailing ‘subject-centered’ accounts of where moral 
obligations come from (Buchanan & Powell 2018). On these views, intrinsic moral worth is 
grounded not in an individual’s contingent ability to care about or cooperate with beings of a 
particular sort, but rather in that individual’s possession of certain morally relevant 
psychological properties. And there is wide agreement, not only among Utilitarians but also 
among contemporary Kantians (e.g., Korsgaard 2018), that it is sentience — not the capacity 
for reason — that sets the minimum bar for being a member of the moral community. 
Carruthers also worries that the moral inclusion of invertebrates would require 
humans to sweep the floor before them like Jainist Monks, so as to avoid stepping on 
scurrying ants and beetles, to say nothing of changes to the global agricultural industry which 
relies heavily on pest management — a ridiculous requirement, he believes, for any secular 
morality. The concern that ‘moral standing creep’ could result in overly demanding 
restrictions on valuable human activities has also figured in the literature on fish welfare (e.g., 
Key 2016). There are several problems with this ‘overdemandingness’ objection as it relates 
to invertebrate inclusion. First, the fact that living up to our moral obligations is hard is a 
patently inadequate reason for failing to meet those obligations.  
Second, the over-demanding line wrongly assumes that moral standing confers 
equally robust protections on all who have it. The fact that an individual meets the minimum 
threshold for moral standing does not entitle that individual to equal treatment (Singer 1974; 
DeGrazia 2008) or confer on them equal moral status (Buchanan 2009). Beings with different 
moral statuses may have different sets of rights, and some moral statuses may be accorded 
no ‘rights’ at all (conceived in terms of their inviolability) even if they entail interests that 
constrain the behavior of moral agents. Similarly, on a continuum of interests view, some 
types of interest (such as future-directed ones) may outweigh others when they come into 
conflict, which is frequently how experimentation on sentient beings who lack future-
directed interests is justified (within the bounds of unnecessary suffering). Thus, even if some 
invertebrates have interests that are in conflict with our own, resolving these conflicts should 
take the same form as conflict-resolutions between humans and non-rational vertebrates in 
moral triage scenarios. Whether harm to a small number of vertebrate subjects is morally 
preferable to harm to a large number of invertebrate subjects is unclear. But such questions 
should be resolved through an analysis of interest conflicts, not by according some legitimate 
interests no weight at all.  




Third, some apparent interest conflicts may disappear once we realize that what 
counts as a harm to human persons may not be a harm to many sentient animals. For example, 
while a painless death is a harm to persons because (e.g.) it frustrates their interest in a 
valuable future, death may not be a harm to animals who have no such future-directed 
interests (McMahan 2002). Thus, including some invertebrates in the moral community may 
not require that we shoulder unpalatable moral burdens, such as drastically altering our 
lifeways or the modes and fruits of scientific enterprise (but see Sebo 2018).  
 
4.  Managing Uncertainty in Science and Ethics  
Thus far, we have argued that the evidence does not justify the asymmetrical treatment 
accorded to vertebrates and invertebrates, and we have suggested that a number of 
questionable empirical assumptions combined with cognitive-affective biases created this 
inconsistent state of affairs. We do not mean to give the impression that there are no 
significant uncertainties concerning the mental capacities of invertebrates. In this section, we 
will consider these scientific uncertainties and how they should interact with ethical science 
policy. 
 
4.1 Error avoidance in comparative cognition.  One general problem facing comparative 
cognitive science is that competing explanations often cannot be adjudicated through 
behavioral evidence alone. The field has typically responded to this ‘underdetermination’ 
challenge by adopting a policy of erring on the side of avoiding false positives: ascribing 
sophisticated mental states to animals who do not in fact have them. This methodological 
strategy is based on the assumption that, all else being equal, one should prefer the simplest 
hypothesis consistent with the evidence, where ‘simplest’ is typically taken to mean ‘least 
cognitively sophisticated’ (Shettleworth 2010; Heyes 2012). Simpler explanations can almost 
always be given, though, and where one fails, another will often rise to take its place. The 
preference for simplicity may be especially strong in the invertebrate context, where it is 
likely to interact with aspects of the invertebrate dogma, such as the belief that small brains 
are unlikely to generate sophisticated cognition. For example, some are likely to interpret the 
fact that bees replicate findings of cognitive research on mammals and birds not as evidence 
for the presence of sophisticated cognition in invertebrates, but as a reason to think that the 
underlying experiments are flawed or that the cognitive capacities being tested are simpler 
than typically thought — either in bees or generally in nonhuman animals. This conclusion is 
bolstered by the fact that, as noted earlier, simple neural networks and robots can recreate 
aspects of invertebrate behavior. 
 There is now a substantial literature arguing that the preference for simplicity is 
conceptually problematic, empirically unsubstantiated, and likely to lead comparative 
cognitive science away from rather than toward the truth (Mikhalevich et al. 2017; 
Mikhalevich 2015; see also Sober 1998; Fitzpatrick 2016; Dacey 2016). Because this problem 
applies to all of comparative cognition, we will not delve into it here. However, it is worth 
noting that some of the inferential strategies that might help resolve the underdetermination 
problem are inaccessible in the invertebrate research context. For example, one way of 
adjudicating competing cognitive hypotheses when they are underdetermined by behavioral 
observation is to bring other sources of evidence to bear on the adjudication, such as 
comparative brain data. If the same brain structures known to support complex cognition in 




some animals are present in others due to their inheritance from a common ancestor, then 
this will add weight to the inference of sentience. 
 These homology-based strategies are generally not available in the invertebrate 
context, however. The centralized nervous systems of invertebrates exhibit little clear 
structural homology with vertebrates, since their brains evolved largely (or entirely) 
independently from vertebrates and from one another (for a discussion of the most likely 
nervous system structure of the last common bilaterian ancestor, see Ginsburg & Jablonka 
2019; Powell 2020; Northcutt 2012; Erwin & Valentine 2011). Homologies at lower levels, 
such as cell-type and signaling molecules (deFur 2004), do not have any straightforward 
implications for sentience or cognitive sophistication. Therefore, if comparative brain data 
can be used to break the evidential impasse in the case of invertebrates, it will have to be 
mainly evidence of the functional, not historical, kind (Mikhalevich et al. 2017).  
As we saw earlier, convergent brain macrostructures dedicated to central processing 
and integration appear to exist in some invertebrates and are corroborated by behavior 
elicited in experiments. Could the preferential treatment of vertebrates over invertebrates 
nevertheless be justified by the greater confidence that brain homology (similarity due to 
common descent) permits in ascribing sentience? There are several reasons to doubt this. 
First, without a well-worked out theory of sentience that tells us what sorts of functional 
configurations we should be looking for, we have no way of knowing what level of homology 
to target. If we take healthy adult humans as the prototypical case of sentience: we cannot 
know how phylogenetically deep the inference of homology should go (e.g., to all primates, 
mammals, tetrapods, vertebrates, etc.) unless we have already identified the structures in 
humans that give rise to sentience. Once we have done so, we can determine the distribution 
of those same characteristics in vertebrates more broadly. The trouble is that homologies 
must be delineated in part by their similarities in function, whether these are cashed out in 
terms of the causal (Amundson & Lauder 1994) or evolutionarily selected (Rosenberg & 
Neander 2009) roles they perform. In other words, homology hypotheses are used to explain 
and classify characters that have already been individuated using various functional metrics; 
if this is so, then homology hypotheses are not function-free and hence have no distinct 
advantages over functional analyses of convergent brains. 
 
4.2 Error-avoidance in ethics and science policy.  One effect of the simplicity preference in 
comparative cognition is that it results in a bias toward false negatives, or failing to attribute 
sentience and sophisticated cognition when in fact they are present. Whether or not the 
preference for false negatives is justified in this domain of research, in bioethical policy there 
are reasons to take the opposite approach: that is, to err on the side of avoiding false 
negatives, or scenarios in which we fail to identify a morally relevant cognitive property in 
nonhuman animals or margin-zone humans when they actually possess them. If the costs of 
falsely attributing sentience to animals are minor while the costs of false negatives are high 
(because, for instance, they result in a great deal of unnecessary suffering), then erring on the 
side of false positives is prima facie ethically preferable. How should we manage the moral 
risk that flows from scientific uncertainty about invertebrate welfares?  
 Ethicists and policy-makers often appeal to the ‘precautionary principle’ (PP), which 
on standard accounts holds that we need not await scientific certainty before taking 
precautionary measures to avoid harm to health or the environment (Sneddon et al. 2014). 
While this may sound like a reasonable approach, there is significant disagreement over how 




the PP should be formulated, whether it is conceptually coherent, whether it is addressed to 
a regulatory straw man, and whether it provides concrete, rational guidance on matters of 
practical moral concern (Sunstein 2003; Powell 2010; Steele 2013). Birch (2017) proposes a 
version of PP that is specifically tailored to the animal welfare context, which he calls the 
Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP). According to the ASPP, ‘where there are 
threats of serious, negative animal welfare outcomes, lack of full scientific certainty as to the 
sentience of the animals in question shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent those outcomes’ (Birch 2017, p. 3).  
Birch’s account has two major virtues. The first is that it attempts to specify the 
relevant evidential threshold below scientific certainty at which precautionary measures 
should kick in. For Birch, the evidential bar for ethics and policy should be set at statistically 
significant and scientifically valid evidence of ‘at least one credible indicator of sentience’ in 
at least one species of an order, which may then be generalized to other species of that order. 
The second virtue relates to Birch’s proposed decision procedure, which is designed to kick 
in once a credible indicator of sentience is found. According to ASPP, rather than leading to 
irrational moral paralysis, wherever the epistemic criterion is met, animal subjects must be 
included in ethical regulatory regimes, but experimental research on those subjects can 
continue so long as minimal welfare requirements are met. 
 Birch’s analysis is a marked improvement over the traditionally vague language of 
precaution, but we believe it could be strengthened on several points. First, Birch cites 
pragmatic justifications for generalizing to the entire Linnaean order: it is not feasible to test 
all species of an order for sentience, he argues, and thus we may generalize from a single 
credible indicator of sentience in a single species to the entire order in which that species 
belongs. Although Birch does not state it explicitly, this justification can only be partly 
practical — the other part must be theoretical, grounded in a two-fold hypothesis about 
homology: first, that the last common ancestor of the ‘order’ (more accurately, the order-level 
clade) was sentient, and second, that the conservation of sentience is more likely than its loss 
in a given order. Both these assumptions need to be defended. The trouble is that the ‘polarity’ 
of a character (i.e., whether it is ancestral or derived) cannot be ascertained without 
examining how that character is distributed in a clade, which is precisely the problem at issue 
here and which Birch claims cannot feasibly be assessed. This point can be illustrated by 
applying the ASPP to language: The ASPP would have us infer from the fact that humans have 
language that all primates (including not only apes, but also monkeys and lemurs) have this 
trait. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that the last common primate ancestor — a shrew-
like creature that branched off from other mammalian orders not long after the end-
Cretaceous extinction — did not have so much as the rudiments of language, and thus the 
inference based on order-level homology is not justified. Other phylogenetic problems with 
the ASPP that stem from its anachronistic Linnaean formulation are discussed by Brown 
(2017) and Mallatt (2017). 
 Second, even if the strategy of inferring homology could be salvaged, the 
generalization only kicks in if a morally relevant mental capacity can be reliably attributed to 
at least one taxon within a given order. The problem is that some will reject the claim that a 
‘credible indicator of sentience’ has been shown in cases where cognitive hypotheses are 
underdetermined by the behavioral evidence. It is not immediately obvious how the ASPP 
would (or should) handle cases of behavioral underdetermination, though one approach 
would be to factor in extra-experimental evidence (such as comparative brain data) and to 




err moderately on the side of over-attribution in light of the biases discussed above and given 
the moral costs of getting it wrong. In addition, although Birch is operating with an 
appropriately broad notion of sentience that includes positive and aversive states, his 
analysis focuses almost entirely on traditional pain perception, which leaves him agnostic on 
the question of invertebrate (especially arthropod) moral standing. We have already seen the 
limits of pain-centered approaches, such as their failure to extend moral protections to beings 
with rich inner worlds that lack traditional markers of pain perception. We have also 
suggested that although pain perception may be a sufficient condition for moral standing, a 
broader range of cognitive and affective abilities should bear on the determination of 
sentience (see §3). The search for a credible indicator of sentience should avail itself of the 
full breadth of evidence, including not only behavioral experiments but also ecology, 
neuroscience, and evolutionary biology; it should also probe for markers of sentience that go 
beyond familiar expressions of pain in response to tissue damage. All told, however, the 
precautionary spirit of Birch’s account could remain valid even if his generalization strategy 
were abandoned in favor of a broader evidence-based approach.   
 Finally, there is a normative problem with Birch’s discussion that it shares with much 
of the PP literature. Namely, it pays inadequate attention to the moral costs that could flow 
from acting out of precaution. Given the high costs of false negatives and the impracticalities 
of testing for sentience throughout the animal kingdom, why not simply generalize to all 
bilaterian animals, rather than (as Birch recommends) to all taxa within a given order? The 
answer, presumably, is that overgeneralization has moral costs. If these costs are likely to be 
substantial — for instance, because erring on the side of caution would significantly interfere 
with or constrain research designed to benefit humans or other sentient animals — then 
aspiring to more targeted judgments about the presence of morally relevant cognitive 
properties may be ethically preferable. If so, then we have strong moral incentives to get the 
attribution of sentience right; extreme positions that require either very high or very low 
levels of certainty ought to be rejected. 
  
5. Summary and Conclusion 
We have argued that the nearly wholesale exclusion of invertebrates with central nervous 
systems from bioethics and science policy is not justified by the current state of the evidence. 
This exclusion is likely driven in part by outdated evolutionary ideas, stereotypes about the 
rigid instinctual behaviors of small-brained animals, cognitive biases that distort moral 
attitudes toward these deeply unfamiliar creatures, and flawed strategies for managing 
scientific and moral uncertainty. We have not offered any practical recommendations for 
changing the treatment of invertebrates. (For concrete policy proposals regarding a range of 
invertebrates, including arthropods, see Carere & Mather 2019; Rethink Priorities 2018; 
Crooke 2013; Horvath et al. 2013; and Cooper 2011.) Our goal here has not been to determine 
whether invertebrates can suffer under specific experimental conditions or live well in 
others; rather, we addressed a more foundational question: whether these animals are 
capable of suffering or flourishing at all. We have made a case for consistency in moral 
treatment: the same kinds of data and reasoning that justify moral protections for vertebrates 
favor extending similar protections to some invertebrates. Invertebrate brains comprise 
upwards of 99% of the brains that exist on Earth. Cognitive theorists have begun to 
appreciate the intellectual rewards of studying invertebrate cognition and sentience. It is 
time that ethicists and policy makers do the same. 
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